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ABSTRACT
I argue that, contrary to what Tom Regan suggests, his rights view 
implies that subsistence hunting is wrong, that is, killing animals 
for food is wrong even when they are the only available food source, 
since doing so violates animal rights. We can see that subsistence 
hunting is wrong on the rights view by seeing why animal experi-
mentation, specifically xenotransplanation, is wrong on the rights 
view: if it’s wrong to kill an animal to take organs to save a human 
life, it’s wrong to kill an animal to eat that animal to save a human 
life or improve human health. I discuss these arguments’ implica-
tions for animal rights-based vegan advocacy, insofar as some people 
claim that they don’t feel their best on vegan diets and so their eat-
ing meat is morally justified. I argue that such an attempt to justify 
consuming animal products fails on Regan’s rights view, but discuss 
some attempts to morally excuse such violations of animals’ rights. 
These attempts are inspired by Regan’s attempts at potentially ex-
cusing animal rights advocates’ using medications developed using 
animals.
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Introduction
Communities that survive by subsistence hunting probably 
rarely, if ever, encounter vegan or animal rights advocacy. But 
a common question asked of vegan advocates is, “What if you 
were somewhere where there was literally nothing else to eat 
but animals? Would eating animals be wrong then?” 
I suspect that many vegan advocates dodge the question, ob-
serving that our finding ourselves in such a situation is very 
unlikely, and very unlike most of our present circumstances 
where vegan foods are readily available. They might also urge 
postponing the question until we found ourselves stuck, say, 
at the North Pole, when it’s a “live” issue for us. They might 
also respond that just as we don’t need to decide whether and 
when human cannibalism is ever morally permissible to know 
that it’s wrong in ordinary circumstances, we also don’t need 
to answer this question to know that we should eat vegan when 
we easily can. And some might respond that, no, it wouldn’t be 
wrong, in those challenging circumstances to eat animals: per-
haps the view would be that “all (or many) bets are off” in such 
extreme circumstances: ordinary moral rules no longer apply. 
I argue, however, to the contrary, that killing animals for 
food, even in circumstances such as these, is wrong: subsis-
tence hunting is wrong. At least that’s what animal rights ad-
vocates, following Tom Regan, should think. I then discuss the 
impact this finding should have for vegan and animal rights 
advocacy insofar as some, more than a few, people claim to not 
feel their best on vegan diets and so argue that their eating meat 
or other animal products is justified. 
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Xenotransplantation and Animal Rights
To see why subsistence hunting – that is, roughly, the kill-
ing of animals for food when there is literally nothing else for 
human beings to eat besides those animals – is wrong, we can 
consider the animal rights basic perspective on animal ex-
perimentation, the using of animals in medical contexts to try 
to benefit human beings. As Tom Regan reviews in his essay 
“Empty Cages: Animal Rights and Vivisection”: 
Experimental procedures include drowning, suffocat-
ing, starving, and burning; blinding animals and de-
stroying their ability to hear; damaging their brains, 
severing their limbs, crushing their organs; inducing 
heart attacks, ulcers, paralysis, seizures; forcing them 
to inhale tobacco smoke, drink alcohol, and ingest 
various drugs, such as heroin and cocaine. (2012, 108)
Experimentation clearly harms animals, especially since 
they are nearly always killed at the end of the experiments. 
The animal rights perspective on animal experimentation is, 
of course, that it is wrong because it violates animals’ rights 
to their lives and bodies, at least. And it’s wrong even if done 
“humanely” and with a painless death: healthy, or potentially 
healthy, animals are done no favors by being killed before their 
natural times. And it’s wrong even if human beings, even lots 
of human beings, benefit from it. That is the animal rights posi-
tion: so-called “animal welfare” positions deny some or all of 
this in permitting animal experimentation if certain conditions 
are met. 
According to the animal rights view, for example, animal 
experimentation in development known as “xenotransplanta-
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tion,” the “harvesting” or theft of organs from animals such 
as pigs and primates to transplant to human beings who will 
likely die without an organ transplant, is wrong (Begley, 2017). 
This is because it violates the animal’s rights whose organ is 
taken and so dies as a result. While it is very unfortunate when 
a human person needs a new organ to survive and that organ 
is not available from a human donor (and no artificial organ is 
available), that does not justify violating any animal’s rights, 
just as it would not justify stealing an organ from a human 
patient in the next room, even if that organ theft victim will 
survive the loss. 
Regan provides a theoretical explanation for why such or-
gan theft, in both human and animal cases, is wrong: doing 
so treats others as mere things for one’s own personal benefit 
(Regan 2004; 1983). Even if it’s a one-time operation, never to 
be done again, organ theft treats someone else as a mere re-
source to be used for the benefit of others. Fundamentally, it’s 
a disrespectful action that denies the victim’s inherent value. 
There are limits to what we may do to save our own lives, even 
when we are “under attack” not by any moral agent or even a 
moral patient but a disease or our own bodies’ malfunctions, 
and violating others’ rights is never a morally acceptable re-
sponse to the attack. For example, if my child is gravely ill, I 
cannot perform a fatal experiment on my neighbor’s healthy 
child to even successfully save my own child’s life, especially 
if the parents don’t consent, and even if they do, since this vio-
lates that child’s rights.
Subsistence Hunting 
We are now able to see why subsistence hunting is wrong. 
Animal experimentation of many kinds is wrong since it vio-
lates animals’ rights. And if animal experimentation of various 
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kinds is wrong, for reasons like those that Regan (and others) 
develops and defends, then it is also wrong to kill animals for 
food even when there is nothing else to eat. 
If it’s wrong to kill an animal to save your life from a likely 
fatal medical problem by taking a pig’s or primate’s organ(s) 
to save your life, then it is also wrong to kill an animal to save 
your life from starvation. If you can’t permissibly kill a pig to 
get an organ to transplant to save your life, then surely you 
can’t permissibly kill the pig to get an organ to eat to save 
your life. One’s “needs,” even one’s needs for what’s needed 
for life itself, need not justify violating another’s rights, as Ju-
dith Thompson made clear in her famous discussion of abor-
tion (Thompson, 1971): even if someone needs to use another’s 
kidneys to stay alive, they do not have a right to the use of those 
kidney’s and nobody violates their rights by not allowing them 
to use their kidneys: a person’s own right to life is not a right 
to others’ bodies, even if that body is needed to preserve one’s 
own life. 
This all seems to imply that substance hunting is wrong: 
hunters do not have a right to animals’ lives and bodies, even if 
those lives and bodies are needed to sustain the hunters’ lives. 
So, unless communities that depend on subsistence hunting 
can find something else to eat that doesn’t involve violating 
rights, they will have to move to stop violating animals’ rights 
in these ways. Or they would have to perish, it seems. 
While this may seem harsh, it is perhaps comparable to a 
country where, for whatever reason, nearly all the citizens are 
in desperate need of organ transplants or else they will die. A 
neighboring country could be raided and its citizens’ organs 
taken, and those people killed in the process. But that would 
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be profoundly wrong, as it would involve massive rights vio-
lations. So, unless another solution can be found, it appears 
that the organ-needy persons would have to perish. This re-
minds us that respecting rights can be personally demanding 
and have high personal costs, but this is a simple consequence 
of the idea of rights: some actions must be done (or must not be 
done) “though the heavens fall” for individuals or communi-
ties. A contrary position, that self-preservation or community-
preservation can be justified at literally any cost to others is 
indefensible. And we can’t forget that, in this case, violating 
rights would have high personal costs to those whose organs 
are stolen and their lives taken.
In the only passage from Regan highly applicable to subsis-
tence hunting that I can find, since he only discusses “sport” 
hunting, he writes this concerning the potential permissibility 
of killing animals for food:
If it were the case that these [essential] nutrients [that 
meat provides] were not otherwise available [from non-
animal sources], then the case for eating meat, even 
given the rights view, would be on solid ground. If we 
were certain to ruin our health by being vegetarians, 
or run a serious risk of doing so . . and given that the 
deterioration of our health would deprive us of a great-
er variety of number of opportunities for satisfaction 
than those within the range of farms animals, then we 
would be making ourselves, not the animals, worse-
off if we become vegetarians. (Regan, 2004/1983: 337, 
emphasis mine).
Regan’s response to this reasoning is just to observe that the 
factual claim concerning nutrition is false: we don’t need to eat 
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animal products to be healthy. So, he responds that meat-eating 
could be justified, if the facts were different from what they 
are, but that they are not. 
Regan does not, however, engage the hypothetical “What 
if?” and underlying moral reasoning behind his argument that 
eating meat could be permissible. This is unfortunate since 
what he says seems to be, at least, inconsistent with the animal 
rights perspective on xenotransplantation. Consider some com-
parable claims:
If we were certain to ruin our health, or lose our lives, 
by not taking organs from healthy animals, or run a 
serious risk of doing so . . and given that the deterio-
ration of our health, and loss of our lives, would de-
prive us of a greater variety of number of opportunities 
for satisfaction than those within the range of farms 
animals, then we would be making ourselves, not the 
animals, worse-off if we refrained from taking organs 
from animals. If it were the case that these organs from 
xenotransplantation were not otherwise available, say 
from human donors or artificial organs, then the case 
for xenotransplantation, even given the rights view, 
would be on solid ground.
Rejecting such reasoning is at the core of the rights view: in-
deed, it distinguishes the rights view from, say, utilitarian and 
other so called “welfarist” perspectives: animals rights must be 
respected, even if that makes human persons worse off. 
So, what Regan says about eating meat appears to be in-
consistent with the rights view. I do grant that if every human 
being had to eat meat to survive, as opposed to a few isolated 
individuals with peculiar biological needs for meat, and that’s 
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the way it always has been, that might make the case feel dif-
ferent: in this world, it would seem unavoidable that we rou-
tinely engage in rights violations. This recognition, however, 
might prompt us to vigorously find some other food sources 
that don’t involve rights violations, or we might realize that we 
are making a choice to violate rights that we don’t really have 
to make, and act accordingly, whatever that might be. 
Rights are not absolute, however; Regan acknowledges that 
they are prima facie in nature and that there can be circum-
stances where violating rights is justified. Indeed, his com-
ments about the “solid ground” for killing animals for food 
might be an application of a misinterpretation of his own 
“worse-off principle,” which is meant to provide guidance in 
cases where we must violate rights:
Special considerations aside, when we must decide 
to override the rights of the many or the rights of the 
few who are innocent, and when the harms faced by 
the few would make them worse-off than any of the 
many would be if any other option were chosen, then 
we ought to override the rights of the many. (Regan 
2004; 1983, 308)
This principle prioritizes those who are made worse off 
by an action, whatever their numbers, when we must violate 
rights: if we must either minorly violate the rights of a 1000 
people or majorly violate the rights of one person, we should 
minorly violate the rights of a 1000: the numbers don’t matter. 
The problem though, if this principle is supposed to justify 
the potential for meat-eating being justified, is this: in cases 
of xenotransplantation, or substance hunting, there are alterna-
tives that don’t involve any rights violations, namely, not steal-
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ing organs and not killing animals for food. That may, or, for 
the sake of argument, will result in human deaths. And those 
human beings might very well be worse off for that than any 
animals would be, if they were killed. But nobody’s rights were 
violated. So the worse-off principle does not apply to cases of 
xenotransplantation, or any typical animal research, or subsis-
tence hunting, contrary to Professor Regan’s remarks, since 
they are not cases where any rights must be violated. 
Vegan Advocacy 
I have argued that subsistence hunting is wrong, if animal 
experimentation is wrong, for animal rights reasons. Few read-
ers of this essay, however, likely encounter subsistence hunters 
or have much, if any, influence over them. We do, however, 
encounter people who claim to just not feel good, or not feel 
their best, on vegan diets, or have medical conditions that make 
eating vegan and staying healthy enough very difficult or im-
possible. At least one successful vegan advocacy organization, 
Vegan Outreach (VeganOutreach.org), very much acknowl-
edges this concern and very much avoids a false message that 
every person who eats vegan will be healthy and feel their best: 
sometimes that is true, but sometimes it is not, and that fact 
must be acknowledged, respected and thoughtfully engaged 
(Adams, Breitman, and Messina, 2017).
Some people who claim to not feel their best on vegan diets 
may be not telling the truth, or haven’t tried very hard, or would 
benefit from skilled nutritional guidance. But it’s surely pos-
sible that some people have sincerely tried hard, have sought 
expert guidance on how to meet their nutritional needs, and yet 
still do not feel well on a vegan or vegetarian diet. It’s not only 
possible that there are such persons, there probably really are 
such persons: they’ve tried their best, but they still don’t feel 
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well on vegan diets. In personal conversation, Regan told me 
that he knew of a man who he (Regan) sincerely believed just 
felt very poorly if he did not eat meat. 
If subsistence hunting is wrong, and it’s wrong to kill ani-
mals to maintain one’s life (as it would be wrong to xenotrans-
plant and take a healthy animal’s organ to save one’s life), then 
it would presumably be wrong to kill animals to maintain one’s 
health, in the vague sense of “feeling good.” If it’s wrong to kill 
animals to stay alive, which presumably is usually more impor-
tant than just feeling good, then it’s also wrong to kill animals 
to feel good and healthy. 
This is not to minimize or trivialize the importance of feel-
ing good: living with chronic pain, or chronic fatigue, or any 
other condition that profoundly worsens someone’s quality of 
life, and perhaps entire worldview, can be very bad for that 
person and those around him or her. But that doesn’t seem to 
justify violating anyone’s rights to try to improve the situation, 
including violating animal rights, and so it would be wrong to 
kill animals for food, even if doing so is genuinely necessary 
to promote or preserve one’s health and feeling well. At least 
that’s what the rights view suggests, it seems. 
Or does it? 
Perhaps not. In Regan’s (2012) essay, “Animal Rights Ad-
vocacy and Modern Medicine: The Charge of Hypocrisy,” he 
considers the charge that animal rights advocates who use pre-
scription drugs, or other medical treatments, developed using 
animals are “hypocrites” or not insofar as they demand that 
animals’ rights not be violated, yet benefit from drugs, the de-
velopment of which involves violating animals’ rights. Regan 
acknowledges that the issue is complex, and his discussion is 
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rich and full of insight and wisdom. And it is applicable to the 
questions at hand.
Regan does not advocate that animal advocates simply let 
themselves die to avoid supporting drug companies’ violating 
animal rights. Presumably, although he does not discuss the 
issues, he would also not encourage animal advocates to starve 
themselves to death to avoid supporting any killing of animals 
for food. 
It should be made immediately clear, however, that the po-
tential of someone dying because they refuse to eat anything 
that directly involves violating animals’ rights is far more unre-
alistic than anyone dying from not supporting the pharmaceuti-
cal industry. This is because it seems likely biologically impos-
sible that anyone must eat recently killed conscious, sentient, 
“subject of a life” animals to stay alive and healthy. It’s hard to 
believe that such a person couldn’t survive and be healthy eat-
ing bivalves or other non-conscious animals, insects, the eggs 
laid by chickens who live good lives, or roadkill, or animals 
who recently died of natural causes, among other options. So, 
an “eat-animals-or-die” case is unlikely compared to a “use-
animal-tested-medications-or-die” case, especially in contexts 
where a variety of foods are available: there will nearly always 
be a way to avoid death without eating what can be called 
“whole” animals. Anyone who lives by subsistence hunting, 
however, might not have these options though: they would have 
to eat whole animals or perish unless they are willing to move 
to a vegan-friendly location (or become cannibals, presumably 
a morally impermissible option). 
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With these qualifications in mind, let’s see if what Regan 
argues about the pharmaceutical case can be extended to any-
one who must eat whole animals or else perish or be unhealthy. 
Regan tentatively and cautiously argues that it can be per-
missible for animal rights advocates to take medications devel-
oped with the use of animals. This is because the animal ex-
perimentation involved in the drug development is accidental 
to the development of the drug, not essential: the animal use 
did not causally contribute to the drug’s development; indeed, 
given misleading results from animal research, the drug may 
have been developed in spite of any results from animal re-
search (287-8). This type of justification could be used to try to 
explain why it’s not wrong to continue to use buildings made 
from slave labor – the buildings were in fact made by slaves, 
but they could have been made without them – and why using 
items made by Nazis using the bodies of their victims is wrong 
– those items could not have been made without brutal, inhu-
mane violations of rights. So it has general plausibility, and so 
perhaps justifies animal advocates taking prescription drugs, 
even though animals’ rights are violated in their development. 
It doesn’t seem though that this justification could plausibly 
be applied to cases where someone must eat whole animals to 
stay alive or healthy. One could say that it is merely acciden-
tal that the needed nutrients are found only in the body of a 
subject-of-a-life animal, not essential, and so it’s not wrong to 
kill these animals to eat them. This claim could be supported 
by observations about the development of “clean” meat, that is, 
meat developed apart from any animal’s body, to try to argue 
that meat and animals are indeed separable: you can have meat 
without animals. To me, however, this is an implausible stretch 
of the principle since, in current actual cases, (a) the nutrients 
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and the body of the animal and (b) the life of the animal are 
basically inseparable. This is akin to a murderer claiming that 
the experience of murdering that he or she seeks are separable 
from the effects on the victim, that there is merely an acci-
dent connection between the two, and so murder is not wrong, 
which is an awful and absurd attempt at a justification. A drug 
and the animal experimentation that was involved in develop-
ment are separable in a way that an animal and his or her con-
sumed body or body parts are not: the latter is a constitutional 
relation, not a causal or temporal relation. So it does not seem 
that Regan’s justification of animal advocates using pharma-
ceuticals can be extended to the eating of animals, even when 
necessary to preserve one’s life or health. 
Recall though that Regan does not discuss this exact issue, 
as far as I know. And, again, we can only suspect that he would 
argue that it can be permissible for animal advocates to eat 
animal products when it is genuinely necessary for them to be 
healthy and feel good enough and that they are not hypocrites 
for doing so. Presumably, he wouldn’t argue that anyone in 
such circumstances must just die or be very ill when eating 
whole animal products would prevent that.
One of the arguments that Regan discusses in favor of ani-
mal advocates using pharmaceuticals is that if they are dead 
or ill then they cannot effectively advocate for animal rights 
(285-7). So, to continue advocating for the respect of animal 
rights, perhaps it can be permissible to partake in some prac-
tices that violate animal rights. Regan’s reservation about this 
argument is that some means to promote, and even secure, 
animal rights would be wrong: for example, Regan states that 
torturing animal researchers’ children to end animal research 
would be wrong. This argument in favor of using pharmaceu-
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ticals doesn’t seem to recognize any moral constraints in seek-
ing animal rights: Regan concludes “what is effective might 
well be morally wrong” (287) and this argument doesn’t rec-
ognize that.
In reply, perhaps the argument could be augmented with a 
constraint that if and only if the supported rights violation is not 
worse than the rights violation that might be prevented in the 
long run by the initial supported rights violation, or is a very 
similar rights violation, then supporting that rights violation 
is permissible. So, for example, someone’s supporting animal 
research, and the animal rights violations involved, is permis-
sible if doing so will enable that someone to help lessen these 
types of violations of animal rights. Torturing children, how-
ever, would not be permissible, even if doing so would lessen 
violations of animal rights, as a worse type of rights violation. 
This response, however, is subject to many concerns: it seems 
to involve “using” one group to benefit another, which rights 
are supposed to make wrong, and it introduces complications 
concerning how to compare the relative badness of different 
rights violations. So this is not a trouble-free amendment to the 
argument. 
But rejecting it, or something like it, is problematic also. It 
is hard to believe that any animal advocates dying for the sake 
of animal rights in any way helps the cause of animal rights, at 
least at present. Indeed, anyone dying for animal rights is a set-
back, both in terms of both the attractiveness of the movement 
to outsiders, potential advocates, and in terms of the numbers 
and morale of current advocates. So while there surely are lim-
its to what can be done to promote animal rights, perhaps sup-
porting some violations of animal rights can be permissible if 
and only if those rights violations are not worse than the animal 
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rights violations we are seeking to end, given broader animal-
rights related goals. 
Regan also emphasizes that the context of our decisions is 
not our own creation: we are thrown into a world full of mas-
sive rights violations, animal and human, and must make the 
most of it to try to lessen these rights violations and work for 
the respectful treatment of all. Since the context of our decision 
is not self-created, and certainly not created with a peaceable 
kingdom in mind, perhaps acts of self-preservation are excus-
able and understandable, even if they involve some participa-
tion in rights violations, if doing so is more likely to increase 
the respect for animal rights than not, in the long run.
Although it is hard to explain why, it appears then that, 
perhaps,a some actions that involve violating animals’ rights, 
such as human beings’ using drugs developed using animals 
and eating animal products when they genuinely must do so for 
good or better health (or life), might be morally permissible, or 
at least excusable, if doing so will better enable the person to 
advocate for animal rights and the rights violations we benefit 
from are not worse than those we try to seek to lessen or elimi-
nate. This proposal might likely apply to many more mundane 
actions that invariably results in harms to animals, such as 
driving and common ways of growing and harvesting crops, at 
least. Arguably these literally avoidable actions violate animal 
rights, and perhaps the proposal developed above helps justify 
them.
Finally, although Regan does not discuss this, but perhaps 
this is a situation where the “impotence of the individual” 
might make a positive difference for animal advocates: in 
most cases, if an animal advocate were to eat meat, or other 
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animal products, it is unlikely that purchase and consumption 
will cause more animals rights to be violated. If so, then eating 
animal products might be a kind of “free riding” that does not 
cause more rights violations but allows for some human being 
to be in a better position to advocate for animals. The same 
might be said about pharmaceuticals developed using drugs, 
although this defense is harder to apply to xenotransplantation, 
if a specific animal is killed for an organ for a specific individ-
ual: then an individual’s actions might plausibly make a causal 
difference to the fate of some particular animal. This justifica-
tion, however, is problematic in that it opens the door to anyone 
justify their behavioral indifference to animal rights because, 
they insist, their actions won’t make a positive difference for 
animals. We surely want to try to resist that type of reasoning 
about all sorts of social justice issues. But, on the other hand, it 
does seem to simply be true that individual actions often don’t 
obviously make the concrete differences we hope they would: 
that truth should likely not be denied and perhaps it sometimes 
makes a difference to, at least, how confident we should be 
about the morality of our actions.
Although it is hard to explain why, it appears then that some 
actions that involve violating animals’ rights, such as using 
drugs developed using animals and humans eating animal 
products when they genuinely must do so for good or better 
health (or life), might be morally permissible, even though they 
involve violating animals’ rights, if doing so will better enable 
the person to advocate for animal rights. 
Whether these rights violations could be justified only if 
they better enable to someone to advocate for animals is an 
interesting question: if “yes,” that answer might, surprisingly, 
result in it being permissible for animal advocates to occasion-
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ally support violating animals’ rights, but wrong for foes of 
animals to do the same action: that is an interesting result, and 
surely one that it would be hard to use to develop policy, as well 
as a bit paradoxical: animal advocates can sometimes support 
animal rights violations, since they will go on to promote ani-
mal rights, but those indifferent to animal rights, and oppose 
it, cannot? Promoting such a view to the public would surely 
not work, so perhaps everyone should be viewed as a potential 
animal advocate and treated accordingly as if they were an ac-
tual advocate (a problematic proposal in itself, insofar as rarely 
should potential things of a kind be treated as actual things of 
that kind).
Conclusion 
In conclusion, vegan advocates are often asked “What if you 
were somewhere where there was literally nothing else to eat 
but animals? Would eating animals be wrong then?” The basic 
options for response are to either dodge the question, answer 
“yes,” or answer “no.” I have argued that the “no” answer, that 
it would be permissible to eat animals in these circumstances 
is contrary to animal rights perspectives: in particular, that rea-
soning would justify xenotransplantation. I have argued that 
the “yes” answer, however, faces challenges but that there may 
be complicated, but plausible, ways to at least morally excuse 
people supporting some violations of animals’ rights, especial-
ly if their doing so better enables them to advocate for animals. 
Perhaps the best and wisest response, for most people, in most 
contexts, is to dodge the question, as perhaps Professor Regan 
did, so that none of us get distracted from the core, immediate, 
and pressing questions and challenges about animal rights that 
confront each of us as we are and where we are, now. 
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Notes
For helpful comments, I am grateful to Robert Bass, Rick 
Bogle, Bob Fischer, Rupert McCallum and Josh Milburn and 
two anonymous reviewers for this journal.
After developing the main arguments for this paper, I read 
Jason Hanna’s excellent paper, “A Moral License to Kill? 
Animal Rights and Hunting,” in Mylan Engel and Gary Com-
stock, eds., The Moral Rights of Animals (Lexington Books, 
2016). He also argues that the animal rights explanation for the 
wrongness of animal experimentation suggests the wrongness 
of subsistence hunting. Hanna’s paper offers some arguments 
that are similar to mine, but for generally overall different pur-
poses, and readers are very much encouraged to read his very 
insightful paper. 
I also observe that Mark Rowlands in Animals Like Us ar-
gues that subsistence hunting is permissible, since it satisfies 
“vital” human interest (161), but that animal experimentation 
never is, even though it could occasionally satisfy a “vital” hu-
man interest (144-50). His arguments are subject to the critique 
above. 
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